We introduce a model of probabilistic verification into the standard mechanism design setting. The principal uses a statistical test to verify the truthfulness of type reports. Testing generates a binary outcome-pass or fail-that depends stochastically on the agent's true type and report. The principal commits to a mechanism that assigns a test to each message and then a decision based on the test outcome. Under quasilinear preferences, we solve for the optimal mechanism by introducing a new expression for the virtual value. When verification is more accurate, the optimal allocation is more efficient and a greater share of the surplus goes to the principal.
Private information can often be verified, but verification is not perfect. If a U.S. taxpayer claims a tax deduction, the IRS can demand receipts proving eligibility. Disability insurance claimants must undergo medical tests to confirm the legitimacy of their claims.
Partial verification was first modeled in mechanism design by [3] . They exogenously restrict the set of reports that each type can send to the principal. Recently, this approach has been generalized to allow for probabilistic verification [1, 2] . Under probabilistic verification, the agent chooses a type report, but this report is detected as a lie with some specified probability that depends on the agent's true type and the report. These models of verification invalidate the revelation principle, as [3] first illustrated with a (deterministic) three-type example that we adapt here.
Suppose there are three types, labeled θ 1 , θ 2 , and θ 3 . Type θ 1 can report θ 1 or θ 2 ; type θ 2 can report θ 2 or θ 3 ; and type θ 3 can report only θ 3 . The principal chooses whether to allocate a good, which all types like. Consider the social choice rule of allocating the good if and only if the agent's type is θ 2 or θ 3 . This rule cannot be implemented truthfully because type θ 1 could report θ 2 in order to receive the good. But this rule can be implemented untruthfully. The principal allocates the good if and only if the agent reports θ 3 . Types θ 2 and θ 3 do so, but type θ 1 cannot.
Without the revelation principle, we cannot restrict attention to mechanisms that induce truthful reporting. The exogenous restriction on type reports is difficult to interpret because it does not necessarily capture each type's ability to mimic other types. Indeed, this ability can depend on the social choice rule being implemented. In the example, the technology specifies that type θ 1 can report θ 2 , but under the untruthful implementation, type θ 1 cannot mimic type θ 2 's report of θ 3 .
In this paper, we present a model of probabilistic verification that separates communication from verification. Instead of restricting the messages that the agent can send, we enrich the standard principal-agent model by endowing the principal with a verification technology in the form of statistical tests. With this approach, a version of the revelation principle holds. Moreover, our model provides a microfoundation for previous models of verification.
We present the verification model in a principal-agent setting. The agent has a private type and the principal controls decisions. The verification technology is a family of binary tests. The principal can conduct one test from this family. Each test is characterized by each type's probability of passing it. We assume that the agent is free to fail each test, so this passage rate imposes an upper bound on the passage probability.
The timing is as follows. The principal commits to a mechanism specifying a message space together with a testing rule and a decision rule. The agent observes his type and then sends a message to the principal. The principal selects a test to conduct. The test result-pass or fail-is drawn, and then the principal takes a decision.
In the main analysis, we characterize which social choice functions can be implemented. As in standard mechanism design without verification, the key is reducing the class of mechanisms that need to be considered. In order to simplify the communication stage, we establish a version of the revelation principle. There is no loss in restricting attention to direct mechanisms in which the agent truthfully reports his type and then passes the resulting test with the highest feasible probability. After this simplification, we still must search jointly over testing and decision rules.
Next, we reduce the class of testing rules. For each fixed type θ , we define a partial order on the set of tests. One test is more θ -discerning than another if it can better distinguish type θ from all other types. Suppose that for each type θ there exists a most θ -discerning test. Then we prove that there is no loss in restricting to the testing rule that assigns to each type θ the most θ -discerning test. From this identification, we define the authentication rate, which specifies, for any two types θ and θ ′ , the probability with which type θ can pass the test assigned to type θ ′ . This allows us to formulate the principal's problem as an optimization subject to incentive constraints.
With probabilistic verification, small deviations can have a small effect on the probability of detection, so the verification technology affects the local incentive constraints. This contrasts with partial verification, where sufficiently small misreports are completely undetectable. Using this local approach, we derive a suitable virtual value that encodes the amount that the verification technology relaxes the local incentive constraints. We use this expression to solve for revenuemaximizing nonlinear pricing. As the verification technology becomes more accurate, the virtual value converges to the agent's true value, so the allocation rule converges to the efficient rule. We also consider the problem of selling a single indivisible good. We show that a posted price is no longer optimal-the price depends on the agent's report.
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